During the first half of the nineteenth century most state judiciaries were the focus of a debate over 'the position and powers of the judicial department'.2 Efforts to secure the judiciary as a separate, independent branch of government were countered by increasing demands to make state government more democratic. Those who favored an independent judiciary found themselves opposed by democrats who thought that all governmental officials should be elected by the people for limited terms. 3 Democrats preferred a system of courts patterned after the Court of King's Bench which had no superior appellate court. Under that system the judges of trial courts rode circuit (thereby renewing contacts with the people) and met periodically to review their own decisions. 4 Opposed to that model was a judiciary headed by a supreme court with only appellate functions and whose judges were free of circuit and other responsibilities. The advocates of a separate supreme court saw it, along with tenure during good behavior, as the only way to secure the prestige and independence necessary to enable the judiciary to check the democracy of the legislature. 5 The democrats perceived the independent model as fostering an elite group of judges., distanced in fact and thought from the people.
Beginning with Georgia in 1812, the judiciaries of a number of states succumbed as the floodgates of democracy opened onto the courts." The immediate causes of change were as varied as the states; but the underlying theme of democratic reform was common to all. The perennial problem of relief for debtors, for example, provoked retaliatory action against the courts of at least two states. In 1815 the Georgia legislature censured the superior court judges for declaring unconstitutional a law suspending the payment of debts. 7 The judges had issued the collective declaration in their appellate capacity while gathered as a conference court. A decade later similar events led to an unsuccessful effort to remove the judges of Alabama's highest court for failing to provide relief for debtors. 8 The process of democratic reform continued through the antebellum years, as evidenced by events in two other states that amended their constitutions contemporaneously with North Carolina's amendments of 1835. The most extreme of these two was in South Carolina, where the legislature abolished the supreme court in 1835 because the court had dared to invalidate a law considered vital to the state's stance on nullification. 9 Two years later, debate on the judiciary dominated the proceedings in the Pennsylvania constitutional convention of 1837.10 The convention proposed replacing tenure during good behavior with fifteen-year terms for judges."
In North Carolina the movement for reform achieved two important successes in the 1835 convention: a more equal apportionment between east and west of seats in the legislature and the popular election of the governor.1 2 The convention did not, however, devote significant discussion to the courts, which is surprising in light of the fact that the preceding two decades had seen repeated attempts to revamp the courts. Those earlier efforts had prompted a warning that unless the electors carefully selected delegates for a proposed constitutional convention, 'they may expect to see the independence of the Judiciary prostrated at the shrine of Legislative caprice and ambition'. 3 But those fears proved to be unfounded. The convention suggested only three amendments concerning the judiciary, each of which actually increased the independence of the judiciary. The most substantial increase in protection came from the declaration that the judges' salaries 'shall not be diminished during their continuance in office'. (The existing constitution, dating from 1776, contained no such protection.) The two other amendments clarified the constitution by specifying two methods for removing judges from office: (1) impeachment 'for willfully violating any Article of the Constitution, mal-administration or corruption'; and (2) removal 'for mental or physical inability, upon a concurrent resolution of two-thirds of both branches of the General Assembly'. 14 Both provisions appear fraught with ambiguities that could be of use to political opponents of the court. The effect of the two amendments, however, was to prcvide additional protection for the courts by making it clear that only the legislature could remove judges. The 1776 constitution, by contrast, allowed for indictment by a grand jury. 1 5 Both amendments also provided protection through the substantial requirement of a two-thirds vote in each house. The 1776 constitution contained no such specification. Moreover, both amendments afforded the court considerably more protection than a democratic amendment popular as early as 1819. That earlier proposal would have allowed removal of judges 'for inability to perform their duty, or any other reasonable cause, on the address of both houses of the General Assembly for that purpose'. 1 6 The earlier proposal also provided that judicial salaries could neither be increased nor decreased during a judge's tenure. The sponsor of the earlier amendment denied that he was opposed to the judiciary. He thought only that it was 'inconsistent with the principles of free Government, that there should be any branch of it perpetually excluded from the control of the people'.' 7 His full-blown democratic position included the belief that if the workload increased or the currency depreciated in value judges should resign and go before the legislature to seek an increase in salary. Then, if they were 'worthy and capable men, they [would] be re-elected'.' 8 Similar arguments gained strength through the 1820s and the early 1830s. Yet by the time of the 1835 convention the court had secured itself against the onslaught of democratic reformers. To understand how the court could be so successful requires an understanding of the history of the court, with particular attention to Ruffin and Gaston' 9 and to their singular public response in an 1834 decision, Hoke v. Henderson. 20 14. See Proceedings, supra note I at 422-23. 
I
A.
North Carolina's first constitution contained only two provisions concerning the establishment of the judiciary. 2 ' One directed that 'the General Assembly shall by joint ballot of both houses appoint judges of the Supreme Courts of Law and Equity, [and] Judges of Admiralty . . . who shall be commissioned by the Governor, and hold their offices during good behaviour'.22 The other provision declared simply that judges should receive 'adequate salaries'. 23 The legislature was apparently left free to decide whether there should be a hierarchy of courts, since the constitution mandated only one level. Furthermore, if the legislature decided to establish other courts, the constitution offered no instructions about tenure or jurisdiction. Even the judges' salaries were left for later determination and possible modification, with the use of 'adequate' rather than an explicit prohibition on reduction of the salaries. In short, the constitution left the legislature wide, though ill-defined, powers to fashion a judicial system.
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That the legislature did not feel constrained by the constitution is evident from the first statute creating courts for the newly independent state. Not one of the courts was 'supreme', either in name or in fact. In name, the first courts were 'superior courts', trial courts with jurisdiction throughout a circuit of counties. At first the legislature divided the state into six circuits with a single superior court sitting only in the major town within each circuit." By the early years of the nineteenth century, however, the growth of population had overwhelmed that system. In 1806 the legislature restructured the court system, directing that a judge of the superior court sit in each county according to a schedule established by the legislature. In fact, since no court was 'supreme', the superior court judges were co-equals. Before 1799 there was not even a formal structure to resolve disagreements among the superior courts. In that year the legislature directed the superior court judges to meet together to settle disputed issues of law and equity that arose on the circuits. 2 7 For the first two years. however, these joint meetings were not acknowledged as a court; they even lacked a name. Then in 1801 the legislature took the first step toward creating a separate supreme court when it gave the name of 'conference court' to a joint meeting of the superior court judges. 2 8 Four years later, in 1805, the legislature renamed the court 'the supreme court of North Carolina' though the composition remained the same. 2 9 In effect, the superior court judges continued to sit en banc to review their own decisions.
Not until 1818 did the legislature establish a separate Supreme Court of North Carolina, under the provisions of a bill introduced by William Gaston. 30 The legislature continued to act as though the language of the constitution controlled little about the judiciary. Indeed, the governor had said as much in his message to the legislature at the beginning of the session: 'for wise purposes, no doubt, the framers of our constitution have granted to you the power of regulating . . . this coordinate department of our government'. 3 ' The governor did, however, think that the constitution required that the judges serve during good behavior. 32 But the legislature was not prepared to concede that point. Instead, it provided in the statute that three judges would be appointed by joint ballot of the two houses of the General Assembly and would 'hold office during good behaviour'. Those provisions would have been superfluous had there been agreement that the constitution controlled the legislature. 27 
B.
In the absence of substantial constitutional restraints on the legislature, the supreme court quickly became a target of attacks by democratic reformers. From the creation of the court the reformers objected to the expense of a court so removed from the people. 3 3 The annual salary of $2500 for each member of the court was higher than that for any other state official. The governor, for example, received only $2000. 34 The president of the state bank earned $2500 and was allowed to practice law in Raleigh. 35 Furthermore, the total of $7500 for judicial salaries was thought to be too extravagant for a state that never spent more than a quarter of a million dollars in any one year between 1818 and 1835.36
For many, though, the high salaries were only symptomatic of a general unresponsiveness of governmental institutions to the people, especially to the growing population of the western part of the state. The entire judiciary was thought to be flawed. At its lowest level the same elite who controlled appointments to county administrative offices also appointed judicial offi- cials such as justices of the peace, sheriffs, and court clerks. 3 7 The middle level of the judicial system, the superior courts, was as maldistributed (taking population as the guide) as were seats in the state's legislature. The judicial circuits also reflected the imbalance of political power. The older, eastern circuits comprised smaller geographical areas as well as smaller counties. The first circuit, for example, lay around the Albermarle Sound, consisting of ten counties with a total land area of less than 4500 square miles. 38 The population of that circuit increased by one-third from 54,000 in 1790 to 72,000 in 1840. The newer, western circuits contained larger counties and more rapidly growing populations. The westernmost circuit, the sixth, covered almost 15,000 square miles with a population that nearly trebled in the same fifty-year period, growing from 57,000 in 1790 to almost 165,000 in 1840. When combined with the relatively greater ease of transportation in the east, the result was that both judges and litigants could travel more readily to court in the east than in the west. As a member of the 'Mountain Bar' would later recall, in the antebellum years 'there was not an inch of railway iron or a navigable stream from Salisbury to Chattanooga. With few exceptions, mail facilities were limited to one delivery per week, carried on horseback.' 39 A legislator from the far western counties of Burke and Yancey painted an even grimmer picture of the problems in a broadside to his constituents which explained the need for a new circuit in the west: '[Owing to the great length of time which the suits are kept in courts, it generally breaks up one party or the other with the accumulation of the cost'. He went on to note that the delays 'too often incited men to take the law into their own hands, and which too often results in [ The complaints were not restricted to the far western counties. The central counties, which voted with the west, had the same problems. Thus, as a member of the House of Commons from one of those counties complained: 'Our citizens have necessarily to travel too far to Court, and that over rapid water courses and rugged mountains-some of them to the distance of seventy-five to a hundred miles'.a" The distances provoked another legislator to emotive language when he wrote to his constituents at the end of the 1831-32 legislative session to express his support for a constitutional convention. Among his complaints was the unwillingness of the east to respond to the problems of the west by creating a new county in an area where it is not uncommon for people to be compelled to go seventy five or eighty miles to court to transact even their smallest public business; and it not unfrequently happens that this distance is traveled on foot, and sometimes by a poor widowed woman, with her infant orphan in her arms, over frozen rivers, rocky hills and snow capped mountains, to take out letters of administration on a very small estate left by her deceased husband.
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In the absence of statistics on the workload of the courts, it is impossible to assess the accuracy of the perception that the western courts were more heavily burdened than those in the east. The persistency of the efforts to provide a remedy does, however, suggest that the complaint of court congestion was real, especially in equity courts.
4 3 This congestion was aggravated by a statutory requirement that equity cases be heard only after jury trials were completed. 44 Regardless of their origins, efforts to relieve the problems facing litigants came to focus on the supreme court, which already was the target of democratic attack. The malleability of the judiciary in these early years of the nineteenth century is evident from the legislature's effort to relieve the 41. Duke RBR., Pamphlets, Debate on the Convention Question in the House of Commons, Jan. 14, 1832, 32 (pamphlet published by Joseph Gales, Raleigh, N.C., 1832 congestion in equity cases through the same statute that established the separate supreme court. The statute authorized any superior court sitting as a court of equity to remove a case to the supreme court 'on sufficient cause shown by affidavit rendering such removal necessary for the purposes of justice'.4" The hope behind that provision is apparent from the report of a senate committee in the following legislative session. The report announced that with the supreme court the state was at last provided with a court 'ready to receive those weighty and numerous equity suits, which have for so many years slept [unheeded] on the dockets of the courts in the west' .46 But that statute provided little, if any, relief, since travel to Raleigh was no easier than travel to a county seat. Local counsel were unwilling to make the trip for fear of losing fees which they might have earned had they not traveled. Litigators from the west therefore often chose to hire special counsel in Raleigh to argue before the supreme court, undoubtedly at a higher cost. 4 7 That unpalatable choice only added support to the familiar democratic attack on a distant court that knew little of the needs of the people. 48 The predictable companion to that complaint was a proposal to have the judges of the supreme court sit in equity courts throughout the s;tate during the months when they were not required to hold court in Raleigh. 49 No blend of democratic argument with remedies for relieving congestion could allay the fears of many politicians of the Whig or old Federalist school that each reform suggestion was motivated by a desire to abolish the supreme court altogether. 50 William Gaston, a former Federalist who later became a Whig, expressed those concerns in a letter written to Baitlett Yancey in 1821. Gaston feared that the next session of the legislature held much danger for the supreme court, then only three years old. The enemies of the court, he predicted, planned 'to make a mob [mock?] court of it by getting the [Circuit] Judges on it and thus destroying its most valuable features, its perfect separation from the tribunals whose decisions it revises'. The Star (Raleigh), Dec. 11, 1818, p. 3, col. I (with the creation of the supreme court the state 'judicial system-will now inspire a confidence and respect which the utmost industry and talent could not before give to it'). He further anticipated that even if that plan failed there would be another and that it would take but one change in the court to 'make a break thro' the dam-the waters will soon demolish it [the court] entirely'." Yancey, who represented the wealthy tobacco interests in Caswell County on the border with Virginia, agreed with Gaston's observations. He reported that he had heard much discussion of plans 'to prostrate the present Supreme Court; or what is the same thing, [to] change . . . the Court by placing the present Judges on the Circuit & directing the Supreme Court to be holden by all the Circuit Judges'. He echoed Gaston's objections to judges reviewing their own decisions and added that having the same judges on circuit as on the supreme court was 'abhorrent to any opinion of a correct and able judicial tribunal of the last resort'. 52 Thus the Whigs found most appealing the very attribute that the democrats found most objectionable in the supreme court-its separation from regular contact with the people.
See

II
A.
With the opposing forces arrayed, the supreme court faced considerable uncertainty about its future. Even though the legislature passed no law concerning the supreme court in the session of 1821, in each of the next dozen legislative sessions, all of the state courts remained targets of the general democratic assault on governmental institutions. As the decade of the 1820's waned, the demands for reform intensified, coming closer each year to success. A bill to allow the people to elect the sheriff in each county became law in January 1830, after failing in each of several preceding legislative sessions. 3 On the heels of that statute came renewed efforts to pass a bill to have the people elect the clerks of the various courts. The sponsor of the successful bill concerning clerks was Senator Spencer O'Brien, an early leader in the political faction that supported Andrew Jackson. 55 O'Brien explained that the present method of appointing clerks for a term 'during good behaviour' was 'wrong in principle'. Furthermore, he reported that 'it led to the evil in legislation of having batches of Justices commissioned when one party prevailed in a County, to remove or elect one man; and perhaps the next year, the same process would be resorted to for unmaking the same individual, who had been made the year before' .56 What 'the people' wanted, he explained, was to elect the clerks. Senator William P. Dobson, from the northwestern part of the state, expressed additional democratic sentiment in support of the bill with his complaint that lawyers controlled 'the courts, and when these courts appoint all their officers, they form an autocracy not sufficiently amenable to the people, and we think, dangerous to liberty'.
For at least one supporter of the bill, however, there was reason to pause before enacting it. He doubted that the legislature had the power to remove sitting clerks from office without some fault of the clerks. 58 64 There is no surviving evidence of the motive for Henderson's decision. other than the fact that both Henderson and Hoke were members of prominent families in Lincoln County, 6 8 there is no indication that they represented competing family interests beyond an apparently isolated dispute over real property. 69 When the parties took their dispute before superior court judge William Norwood, he held that the 1832 act, which divested Henderson and made clerks electable, was unconstitutional. 70 The case, replete with difficulties for a court already under attack by the sponsors of the challenged statute, then went to the supreme court.
B.
The judges themselves had followed the increasing strength of the democrats with apprehension, recognizing that the statutes creating elective sheriffs and court clerks were but steps toward changes in the judiciary. The judges found the repeated efforts to reduce their salaries particularly objectionable and foreboding. 7 ' In December 1828, Chief Justice John Louis Taylor had written to Thomas Ruffin, who was then a judge of the superior court, and explained the practical effects of a reduction in salary. Taylor related that he wanted to continue living in the country, rather than in the city of Raleigh. He thought he could do so, he explained, unless the legislature reduced the salary below $2000. 'A reduction of the salary simply to $2000 would not change my resolution. A reduction below that sum would unavoidably make an entire change in my life, and no longer leave me master of my possessions. '72 Ruffin was fully aware of the legislative activity and its implications for he hoped that a long judicial career lay ahead of him. Between 1825 and 1828 he had sat on the superior court, riding circuit with the other judges. But he evidently had his eye on the next vacancy on the state supreme court.
7 3 Before a vacancy occurred, however, the presidency of the state bank became available. While trying to decide whether to accept the presidency or to wait for a supreme court seat, Ruffin wrote to a close friend, Peter Browne, setting out various arguments for accepting each office. Ruffin was especially concerned about the effect of another of the recurring proposals to weaken the supreme court-the requirement that judges ride circuit for newly created equity courts. Browne's response recalled Gaston's fears in his letter to Yancey that the first successful attack on the court would open the floodgates for many more. Browne wrote that he was 'fully convinced that the first alterations, either for the better or worse, will be followed by others, until they amount to actual or virtual annihilation' . 7 Possibly influenced by apprehensions of legislative interference with the courts, Ruffin decided to take the position with the state bank, in spite of the opposition the appointment raised. 75 When Chief Justice Taylor died less than a year later, Ruffin's friends importuned him to accept the seat on the court if offered. 76 The council of state appointed John D. Toomer to fill the vacancy on an interim basis 77 but the legislature chose Ruffin to fill the seat when it met six months later. 78 Ruffin obviously had the support of many throughout the state; 79 one historian has written that in the late 1820s, Ruffin 'was the most highly esteemed citizen and the most popular man in the State'. 80 During the same session of the legislature, the correspondent of the New Bern Spectator was equally gloomy in his forecast that the House of' Commons would join the Senate in passing a bill to reduce the salaries of the supreme court judges by twenty percent, from $2500 to $2000.85 The bill continued the practice of indirect attacks on the court, anticipating that a single victory would trigger a comprehensive assault on the court. Thus, the correspondent predicted that the bill would 'be the means of creating an unexpected vacancy on the bench. It is a pity,' he continued, 'that the bill for abolishing the Court and restoring the old system, did not pass, (it failed only by a tight vote)-for that the present Court will only hold out for a few years a sickly existence, I judge from the indications of the present winter' .6 Priestly H. Mangum, speaking in the House of Commons, echoed those fears. He reported that he had heard that the purpose of the bill was to effect the destruction of the supreme court. 87 William Gaston also opposed the bill. He wrote to his daughter about the bill and, in passing, provided what must have been a bit of autobiographical explanation for his own unwillingness to be a candidate for the vacancy on the court. Referring to the bill to reduce the salaries as a 'shameless deed', he explained that such 'contempt of public faith has an inevitable tendency to render men of 81 sensibility unwilling to place themselves in a state of dependence on such a body'. 88 By a narrow vote (59 to 55), however, the House of Commons defeated the bill, voting to postpone it indefinitely. 8 9 Nevertheless, the future of the supreme court was no brighter when Chief Justice Henderson died late in the summer of 1833. The democratic forces were likely to advocate even more strongly the whole range of measures to alter the system now that the court lacked the prestige of a long-serving member. 90 Realization of this prompted one of the state's leading attorneys and a former Federalist, Thomas P. Devereux, to begin immediately a campaign to rally support against the democrats and to persuade Gaston to be a candidate for the supreme court vacancy. 'Nothing', he wrote Gaston, 'can save the Supreme Court unless you will consent to take a seat upon it'. Gaston's willingness to serve on the court was, Devereux urged repeatedly, 'the only thing which can restore confidence to the public mind'. 91 Devereux spoke primarily for the Whigs, for he added that the universality of sentiment for Gaston arose 'in the circle in which I associate, Governor Swain included'. 9 2 David Swain, the first Whig governor of the state, had made almost the same prediction to Gaston immediately after learning of Chief Justice Henderson's death: '[11f any other name [than yours] is presented the Supreme Court dies with the lamented Ch. j. 93 Ruffin himself also joined in urging Gaston to serve. Ruffin repeated to Gaston what he had said to Devereux-that he would 'rather serve with [Gaston] than with any man on earth'. 9 At the fore of Ruffin's thoughts, though, were the legislative threats. He alerted Gaston that he would continue in office. He explained to Gaston that he could 'submit to any law', but he could not submit to what he termed 'the unauthorized caprice of the sycophants (not the representatives) of the people' .
Gaston already shared Ruffin's apprehensions about the activities of the legislature, as was evident in his earlier letter to his daughter. The concern grew as he faced the prospect of giving up a profitable practice of law for the bench. His considerable indebtedness made him especially anxious about the security of the salary. 96 But he, like Ruffin, also objected strongly in principle to any suggestion that the legislature should control the salaries of judges. He explained to Ruffin that 'the possibility that sooner or later these efforts of Demagogues may be successful in actually destroying the independent tenure of the Judicial office' made him reluctant to accept the position. 97 And to Devereux, he disavowed any interest in whether the salary was $2500 or $2000. 'But once appointed', he continued, I should hold myself bound to resist by the most efficient means all attempts on the part of the legislature to alter, diminish or afterwards take away the salary previously attached to the office ....
If the demagogues should succeed in breaking down the stipulated compensation, I should hold myself unquestionably absolved from the obligation to remain in office. 98 Finally, late in September 1833, Gaston indicated his willingness to be nominated for the supreme court. 99 But the announcement did not fill the vacancy. There was at least one challenger to Gaston, superior court judge Henry Seawell, who sought advantage from the sectional animosities and the fact that Gaston was a Roman Catholic. counties Seawell insinuated that Gaston was the choice of the eastern establishment.
In spite of those efforts, the General Assembly elected Gaston shortly after it began its session in November 1833.101 In the same month the General Assembly defeated both a bill to abolish the supreme court and a bill to reduce the judges' salaries. 102 The Raleigh correspondent for the New Bern Spectator, the newspaper from Gaston's home town, explicitly linked Gaston's election with the defeat of both bills.' 0 3 The correspondent of the Tarborough Free Press concurred, writing of the failure of a bill to reduce salaries: 'The Court is decidedly more popular with the Legislature than it ever was, and I presume this is owing in great degree to the high character, for talents and integrity, of the gentleman last elected to its Bench 
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The appointment of Gaston stilled for the moment the efforts to destroy the court. But no one could know how long the calm would last, especially in light of the growing support for a constitutional convention. Thus, when the appeal in Hoke arrived, shortly after Gaston took his seat, the court recognized the opportunity to speak publicly on an issue that had privately troubled Ruffin and Gaston for fifteen years. Their apprehensions about efforts to make state government more 'responsive' to the people had driven Ruffin to the brink of resignation and had made Gaston loath to accept the nomination. The opportunity was especially apt because the clerks and the judges of the supreme court were in precariously similar positions in that both served in offices created by statute which declared their tenure to be 'during good behaviour'. *06 Neither had unquestioned constitutional protection in office.
The absence of constitutional protection would later prove decisive for every other court that considered questions similar to those presented in Hoke. These other decisions established the rule that a legislature could not alter that which the constitution provided, from tenure to salary. But a legislature had unrestrained power to alter any office not so protected. As Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts wrote: 'Where an office is created by law, and one not contemplated, nor its tenure declared by the constitution, but created by law solely for the public benefit, it may be regulated, limited, enlarged or terminated by law, as public exigency may require'.' 0 7 In light of the general language in the North Carolina constitution of 1776, there was at least a potential argument that the constitution provided no restraint on the legislature in dealing with the offices it had created, clerks as well as supreme court judges. To defend against that potential, Ruffin, writing for the court, set about establishing a large sphere within which the legislature could not interfere with the judiciary.
Ruffin used three steps to reach his conclusion that the legislature had acted unconstitutionally.' 08 First, he explained that the statute ousted the sitting clerks. Second, he wrote an essay on the nature of separation of powers and concluded that the legislature could not perform a judicial act. Third, he held that a clerk had a property interest in his office-a right that could be restricted only in accord with the 'law of the land',' 09 which Ruffin interpreted as requiring some form of judicial proceeding.
Only the third step in the analysis is remarkable; that holding is contrary to the rule in every other American jurisdiction. 'l0 But Ruffin's opinion rather neatly used the first two steps to predispose the discussion toward the outcome on the third as well as to bow repeatedly toward the legislature. By so doing he achieved the desired political effect of appeasing the legislature while at the same time warning it not to tamper with the judiciary.
The first question posed a problem only because the statute was so poorly worded that it failed to declare that sitting clerks were no longer to hold office. Ruffin might have taken advantage of the poor wording to interpret the act as being prospective only, thereby avoiding the constitutional issue altogether. But he chose not to do so, apparently aware of the common understanding during the legislative debate that the bill would apply to incumbent clerks."' Ruffin carefully parsed the statute to show that incumbent clerks must run for election if they hoped to remain in office. I12 Ruffin did more, however, than list the sections that made the conclusion seem irresistible. Like the paradigmatic example of judicial politics, Marbury v. Madison, 1 ' 3 Ruffin repeatedly went out of his way to disclaim interest in doing anything other than merely following the legislative will. For example, he wrote that the policy and consequences of a statute were 'political considerations, fit to be weighed by and to influence the legislators; but if disregarded by them, their responsibility is to their constituents, not to the courts of justice'. 1 14 'To a Court', he continued, 'the impolicy, the injustice, the unreasonableness, the severity, the cruelty of a statute! by themselves merely, are and ought to be urged in vain'. " 5 Having written his obsequious comments, Ruffin then turned to the second issue: whether the legislature had the power to enact the statute. Quite obviously resolution of that issue depended upon the nature of the statute and upon what the statute did. Ruffin began his discussion by cleverly describing the statute in a way that prejudiced all subsequent discussion. According to Ruffin, the statute 'transfers the office of clerk from one of these parties to the other, without any default of the former, or any judicial sentence of removal'. 116 He might have generally characterized the statute as changing the tenure of holding office, leaving to the electorate the task of naming a new clerk. Or he might have responded, as did every other contemporaneous court, by recognizing the democratic impetus of the American revolution and concluding that the people, through their legislators, had the right to alter the terms of public officeholders.' 11 He chose neither of those options. Instead, his phraseology made the statute into a determination by the legislature of a particular dispute between Hoke and Henderson. What was a statute removing all clerks from office in--discriminately thus became a judicial decision operating between two parties. Ruffin's characterization would prove crucial later in the opinion. But first he turned to an essay on the nature of state government.
Ruffin seemed especially anxious to explain that the court posed no threat to the democratic interests in the legislature. 'Courts', he wrote, 'must enforce [legislative] enactments; for they are laws to them by the mere force of the legislative will'.'' 8 He acknowledged that in rare circumstances the court had an obligation to announce that the legislature had exceeded its powers. 1 19 But on those occasions, the legislature was sure to 'rejoice in the rescue of the Constitution from their own incautious and involuntary infraction of it'. 120 There was no reason, according to Ruffin, for the legislature to fear the judiciary, for it had no opportunity to compel acceptance of its own views of policy. Rather, the task of a judge was no more than to implement the very democratic principles embraced by the legislators; it was 'the humbler and easier one of they might do, or should not do'.1 2 1 To insure that no one missed his message, Ruffin repeated the self-deprecation by asserting that the task of the judge was comparatively humble'. So humble was the judicial function that it did 'not call for those high attainments required for wise legislation'.
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Having sought to allay legislative fears, Ruffin returned to the less palatable portions of the opinion. His language, though, was Marshallian in stating propositions of such grandeur and general acceptance with which no one could disagree. He began with the premise that the 'great object of society [was] to enable men to appropriate among themselves the things which, in their natural state were common'. 23 From that premise he deduced the whiggish conclusion that the best government was one which protected private property 'even from the government itself'.' 2 4 Ruffin's language here revealed a sympathy with that of the established interests in the state. Those interests argued that the existing apportionment of the legislature was fair because it reflected property values. Legislative spokesmen could oppose any call for reform by arguing for continued security for property: 'What is the object of all good government? The protection of persons and property; but more especially of property, since that is more apt to be invaded. ' 25 Ruffin's only support for his deduction came from two admonitory provisions in the declaration of rights from the North Carolina Constitution of 1776. The first stated 'that no freeman ought to be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land'. 1 26 The second provided 'that the legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate, and distinct from each other'.'
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For Ruffin the two principles blended into a single declaration that the legislature could constitutionally do nothing judicial. In that light, his efforts to portray the statute as a judicial act became especially important. Realizing that, Ruffin repeated his definition that anything which took a right from one person and gave it to another was a judicial act. not purely judicial, it was enough that 'it partakes of that nature'. As Professor John Orth has recently noted, such an absolute demarcation of the legislative function ran contrary to the 1776 constitution itself (which assigned certain judicial functions to the legislature) and to the developing spirit of the times (which granted large measures of power to the legislature). 13 ' Moreover, Ruffin ignored the actual practice of government in North Carolina. Even a cursory examination would have revealed considerable blurring of the lines between the branches of state government. There were innumerable private laws passed in each legislative session which determined rights between parties by, for example, granting divorces, legitimizing people, and restoring credit.
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Ruffin also omitted from his argument the important statutes which had defined the nature of the office of clerk of court.' 33 Nine years after decreeing that clerks should hold office 'during good behaviour', the legislature proclaimed that county clerks who issued writs before receiving the appropriate tax 'shall be deemed guilty of misbehavior in office'. 1 34 Fourteen years later the legislature enacted the following statute, which provided its own rationale:
Wheareas doubts are entertained whether the courts of pleas and quarter sessions Ithe county court] within this state have the power to remove their clerks from office for neglect or misbehaviour:
Be it therefore enacted, &c. That the said courts of pleas and quarter sessions shall have full power and authority, on their respective clerks being convicted or found guilty, in the courts aforesaid, on a bill of indictment for neglect of duty or misdemeanor in office, to remove such clerk, and proceed to the election of another, provided a majority of the justices of the county are present at the election of such clerk .... In 1822 the legislature amended the law so that a majority of the judges could remove clerks, apparently without a trial or any other proceeding. 136 However one might ultimately untangle the statutes, it seems clear that by Ruffin's definition the legislature had performed several judicial acts. First it had declared what should constitute 'misbehaviour in office'; and foresaw no need for a trial to determine guilt since the clerk was to be 'deemed guilty'. Later the legislature retrospectively declared what the law was with respect to the removal of clerks.
Nevertheless, Ruffin persisted in his efforts to corral the legislature. He added the conclusion that the clerks bill violated the 'law of the land' provision because it permitted property to be taken without appropriate procedures.1 37 That this point is but a restatement of his first conclusion is evident from his explanation that the legislature had deprived a 'citizen of his property, without trial before a judicial tribunal, and a decision upon the matter of right, as determined by the laws under which it vested, according to the course, mode and usage of the common law as derived from our forefathers'. 138 Continuing to write as though the American revolution had made no change in the nature of government,' 3 9 Ruffin then turned to the key question in the inquiry, the answer to which he had assumed from the start: whether an incumbent had a property right in the office of clerk of the superior court. Ruffin contented himself with the assertion that 'property' was whatever a person could possess and enjoy by right. An office was therefore a property right. He buttressed his conclusion by noting that 'commentators on the law' included an office among 'incorporeal hereditaments'. And, in the crucial part of the opinion, he approved the definition of an office as 'the right to exercise a public or private employment, and to take the fees and emoluments thereunto belonging '.140 To In the United States, no public office can properly be termed an hereditament, or a thing capable of being inherited. The constitution, or the law of the state, provides for the extent of the duration of the office, which is never more permanent than during good behaviour ....
It would not be consistent with our manners and usages, to grant a private trust or employment to one, and his heirs, in fee; though I do not know of any positive objection to such a contract in point of law.1 43 The extent to which Ruffin's opinion was inconsistent with the democratic spirit of the times is further evidenced by decisions of two other state courts in the year following Hoke. Both bluntly rejected Ruffin's conclusion. In Georgia the court wrote: 'That a public office is the property of him to whom the execution of its duties is entrusted, is repugnant to the institutions of our country and is at issue with that universal understanding of the community which is the result of those institutions.'" 44 The New York Supreme Court had a similar opinion:
It is an unsound and even absurd proposition, that political power, conferred by the legislature, can become a vested right as against the government in any individual or body of men. It is repugnant to the genius of our institutions, and the spirit and meaning of the constitution; for by that fundamental law, all political rights not there defined and taken out of the exercise of the legislative discretion, were intended to be left subject to its regulation. 145 Ruffin apparently recognized the difficulty with his position for he then made a series of concessions in which he acknowledged that a 'property' right in a public office was different from a 'property' right in a parcel of land. For instance, he admitted that the right to a public office was not absolute but existed only 'in safety to the general interest'. the subject of property, as every other thing corporeal or incorporeal, from which men can earn a livelihood and make gain. The office is created for public purposes; but it is conferred on a particular man and accepted by him as a source of individual emolument.
To the extent of the emolument it is private property, as much as the land which he tills, or the horse he rides, or the debt which is owing to him. 149
Ruffin's characterization more closely resembled a 'contract' right than a property right. Had he used the term 'contract' he would have followed a usage common in North Carolina at the time. During debates on proposals to reduce the judges' salaries, Gaston and other legislators had regularly referred to a contract between the state and the judges which could not be broken by either side.1 50 Ruffin's adherence to the 'property' characterization is understandable in light of the fact that there was no protection for contract rights in the state constitution. The contracts clause of the federal constitution' 5 1 likewise offered no protection.' 52 So Ruffin was forced to find a property right if he was to protect the clerks.
To this point in his opinion Ruffin had jealously guarded the judicial power. He had used flattery and disclaimer to emphasize the principle that the legislature could constitutionally do nothing that even partook of the judicial. There remained, however, unanswered arguments. Ruffin turned to them with an eye on the case and his memory acutely aware of legislative attempts to strike at the courts. The first of these remaining arguments brought Ruffin back to the fundamental point he had glossed over earlier: whether post-revolutionary doctrine precluded holding that there was a property right in a public office. Ruffin provided a negative answer to the question without doing anything other than repeating his conclusion that an office was property. In doing so, however, he repeatedly took advantage of opportunities to illustrate his point with advice about what the legislature could not do to the judiciary itself. The advice was purely dicta. Ruffin had already supported his conclusion that the right to an office was a property right. The only explanation for the dicta lies in realizing that Ruffin was using his opinion to respond to legislative attacks on the court. Ruffin conceded that unless there was a prohibition in the constitution, the legislature had the power to create and to abolish offices.' 53 He wrote that a person 'takes the office with the tacit understanding, that the existence of the office depends on the public necessity for it; and that the Legislature is to judge of that'. 154 He refused, however, to concede that such legislative control over an office meant that the office was not property. He offered no new rationale, only another refrain of the assertion that the office was property. 1
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He also rejected the argument that the power to abolish an office meant that the legislature had the power to discharge the incumbents. ' [W]hile the office remains', he wrote, 'it is not possible that the public interest can be concerned in the question, who performs the services incident to it. The sole concern of the community is, that they should be performed, and well performed, by somebody. 1 56 Those sentences belied his earlier disclaimers of interest in policy considerations. He also again ignored the democratic spirit which would have favored the argument that the concern of the community also extended to a desire that important public officials be selected by the people rather than appointed by individuals (the judges) not responsive to the electorate. Then Ruffin turned to what was his main point, that an officeholder had a right to the income from the office. 'It is true that a clerk, like all other officers, is a public servant; but he has also a private interest.' 157 That interest, Ruffin explained, was in the emoluments of the office, which could not be transferred without taking value from one person and giving it to another.
As Ruffin offered more explanation he digressed onto the type of tenure afforded a clerk. He thought it for the benefit of the public that some offices be appointed during good behavior. His reasoning was in keeping with the generally whiggish tone of the opinion: '[The services] may be expected to be best done by those, whose knowledge of them, from time and experience, is most extensive and exact."
158 That he had in mind more than the office of clerk is evident from the example he used-the constitutional provision requiring that judges be appointed during good behavior. And he offered the gratuitous observation that the tenure of judges was for the benefit of the public, so 'that he who is to decide controversies between the powerful and the poor, and especially between the government and an individual, should be independent, in the tenure of his office, of all control and influence, which might impair his impartiality'. 1 59 Warming to the topic which had, after all, concerned him keenly for almost a decade, he suggested that without such security, the judiciary would be subject to a variety of pressures, including 'influence . . . produced by the threats of the government to visit nonconformity to their will, by depriving him of office, or rendering it no longer a means of livelihood'.'
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From that digression Ruffin returned to admit that clerks did not have the protection of tenure stated in the constitution. But, he asserted, that did not matter, for once the legislature granted tenure during good behavior it could change it only prospectively. He offered no citation or explanation for his conclusion other than the circular one that there was a property interest in the office. Ruffin thereby effectively eliminated any distinction between constitution and legislation since both served to bind the actions of future legislatures.
Other arguments included the position that there could be no property interest since the legislature had complete power to alter the salary for the office. Ruffin's response would come as no surprise to anyone familiar with his private correspondence: so long as the office was necessary the legislature would not be presumed to abolish it or eliminate its salary merely for the purpose of replacing or starving the officeholders. 'If such a law were to pass, it would itself be unconstitutional-that being the object. ' 6 1 Then, having issued the direct advisory opinion, he retreated, stating that no court had power to inquire into motive.' 62 But the memories were too sharp for him to resist one more attempt at instruction: for the legislature to try to abolish an office indirectly (by eliminating the salary) when it could not do so directly would be 'a gross and wicked infraction of the Constitution'. 163 To be absolutely certain that his point was understood, he provided another example, with this initial disclaimer: 'Not to allude to the causes which have been recently the themes of the bitterest political controversies.' "64 'Suppose', he wrote, the legislature were to refuse to elect the judges 159 or to give them salaries; or, after assigning them salaries in the statute, to refuse to lay taxes, or to collect a revenue to pay them. All these would be plain breaches of constitutional duty; and yet a court could give no remedy, but it must be left to the action of the citizens at large to change unfaithful for more faithful representatives. 165 Not since John Marshall told James Madison and Thomas Jefferson that withholding a commission was 'not warranted by law [and] violative of a vested right ' 166 had the least dangerous branch penned such pointed chastisement.
The final point that Ruffin attempted to rebut was the suggestion that there could be no property interest since the rights were not mutual; the state might have the obligation to continue the clerk in office but the clerk might freely resign. Ruffin thought otherwise, again resorting to his implicit understanding that a contract right was at issue. Resignation would be ineffective until accepted; without acceptance the clerk remained obligated to perform. 167 Again, Ruffin had no precedent for support, only assertion and example. His examples referred not to a general point but to statutes that explicitly provided for an obligation to serve. He seemed not to appreciate that those statutes might be exceptions to a general freedom to resign. Nevertheless, he took the opportunity to offer further instructions about the nature of the officeholder's obligation, obviously influenced by the recent bills to reduce judicial salaries. 'If indeed the public change the emoluments of office, it is another question, whether that be not an implied permission for the officer to retire at his election ...
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Ruffin ended the opinion with another disclaimer that the decision was based on other than a dispassionate consideration of all the issues and 'without a desire to swerve to either side from the direct line of the law and the Constitution'.1 69 But the court was unanimous in its decision that the law was unconstitutional.
IV
In striking down one of the democrats' favorite pieces of legislation the court could well have expected a retaliatory rejoinder. But there was no outburst. In fact, Hoke provoked nothing other than perfunctory reports in a few newspapers. The silence in North Carolina is markedly different from 165. Ibid. more extreme reactions to similar judicial decisions in other states: the abolition of the supreme court in South Carolina and the censuring of the judges in Georgia. There are multiple explanations for the differences. Politics in antebellum North Carolina never became as divisive as in other states, South Carolina in particular. The split between east and west in North Carolina, though sharp, was never so bitter as the feelings about nullification in South Carolina. Moreover, the effect of Hoke was muted by the fact that most clerks had resigned immediately after the statute was passed, making the decision largely meaningless except as an instruction to the legislature. But the court had struck at the democratic notion of an unbounded legislature and the democrats had not reacted. The absence of a reaction suggests that personalities played as important a role as did political philosophies. Ruffin and Gaston together appealed to the major political interests in the state. Ruffin was from the central part of the state. He had flirted with democratic politics; but he wrote a decidedly whiggish opinion in Hoke. What little dislike there was of him arose in the east, and that dislike was mollified by the appointment of Gaston, a native of the east-coast town of New Bern. But Gaston too transcended the sectional lines. He had long been a supporter of internal improvement and constitutional changes favored by the west. Indeed, Gaston was a leader in the convention of 1835 on behalf of democratic reform. With those two men on the court all but the most radical democrats would be assured of an even-handed court, even when it struck down an important aspect of their political agenda.
